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COURT OF APPEALS, 1958 TERM
APPEALS OF RiGHT-FNALTY OF DETERMINATION
In the recent case of People v. Scanlon49 the defendant applied to the
Supreme Court for an order to vacate a final judgment rendered in 1939 per-
manently enjoining him from acting as a dealer in securities. The injunction was
issued by consent of the defendant under Article 23-a of the General Business
Law, commonly known as the Martin Act. The motion to vacate was grounded
on the fact that the defendant's subsequent conduct had made the injunction
unnecessary and inequitable. The Supreme Court granted the order to vacate.50
On appeal the Appellate Division reversed, holding that after the expiration of
two years from the entry of a permanent injunction under the Martin Act the
Special Term was without power to vacate.51 The Appellate Division deter-
mined that the Supreme Court lacked power to vacate the injunction on two
grounds: (1) that the injunction in question was designed to protect the public
and not to punish the defendant, hence the statute authorizing the injunction
does not contemplate modification of the judgment on a mere showing of
subsequent good conduct, and (2) that Section 528 of the Civil Practice Act,
which sets a two year time limit on motions to set aside a final judgment for
error in fact not arising upon the trial, is designed to insure the finality of
judgments. 52
The defendant appealed as a matter of right from the order of the
Appellate Division. The Court of Appeals held that inasmuch as this was an
appeal taken as of right and not under subdivision (3) of Section 588 of the
Civil Practice Act, it must be dismissed as it is not from a final determination. 53
In Cohen and Karger, PowERs OF THE NEw YoRx CourT oF ApPExAs, there
is a discussion of the finality attributable to orders on motion to vacate or
amend prior determinations.5 4 Among the several possible dispositions of such
motions set out in the above named text, and the conclusion of finality arising
from such dispositions, is situation (b), "motion to vacate granted and the
Appellate Division reverses the decision," which is the situation in the instant
case.5 5 In such a situation, no change occurs in the original determination. The
order of reversal merely requires adherence to the prior final determination and
49. 6 N.Y.2d 185, 189 N.Y.S.2d 143 (1959).
50. 15 Misc.2d 56, 178 N.Y.S.2d 374 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
51. 7 A.D.2d 648, 180 N.Y.S.2d 93 (2d Dep't 1958).
52. People v. Haynes, 2 Misc.2d 983, 150 N.Y.S.2d 53 (Sup. Ct. 1956); See People
v. Riley, 188 Misc. 969, 64 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
53. N.Y. Civ. PaAc. AcT § 588, appeals as of right.
54. Cohen and Karger, Powers oF Tm COURT OF APPEAIs § 36.
55. Other situations set out in the text follow: (c) "motion to vacate or amend
denied, and order then affirmed." There can hardly be two final determinations reaching
identically the same result in a single litigation. The final determination had already been
made. (d) "motion to amend granted." It is an accepted rule that an order which
alters a final determination and grants final relief different from that already settled is
itself a final order. (e) "motion to amend granted, and order then reversed." This
can be distinguished from the situation set out in (b) above on the rationale that the
decision of the Special Term constitutes a new and original determination which cannot
be altered by any act of the Appellate Division. A decision has been made in which
the Court of Appeals should not be foreclosed from reviewing.
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is not itself a final determination. As the Court of Appeals stated: "There is
no question but that the judgment of permanent injunction issued in 1939 was a
final determination. The order of the Appellate Division reversing the order
to vacate that judgment neither adds to nor detracts from the rights of the
parties as determined by such judgment-it merely adheres to the already
final determination. That being so, it is non-final in character and the de-
fendant's appeal therefrom must be discissed."5 6
OFFICIAL REcoRDs ADMISSIBLE UNDER CPA SECTION 374-A WITHOUT CALLING
ENTRANT AS WITNESS
Prior to the enactment of Section 374-a of the Civil Practice Act any
memorandum or record of a business could not be introduced into evidence
without first calling as witnesses all parties who had any part in making
such memorandum or record.57 This section allows such memorandum or record
to be admitted into evidence without first calling the entrant as a witness
if it was made in the regular course of such business. 8
In Kelly v. Wasserman,5 9 plaintiff attempted to introduce records kept
by the Department of Welfare of two conversations between a representative
of the department and the defendant. The records, if admitted, would have
produced inconsistencies in defendant's testimony as to an oral agreement had
between the defendant and plaintiff that led to a conveyance of plaintiff's house
to the defendant. The trial court refused to admit the records into evidence.
The Appellate Division affirmed,60 and the Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded for a new trial.0 1
It was unclear to the Court whether the records were excluded by the trial
court because the statements were hearsay, or because they were put in
evidence as contradictory statements made by the defendant out of court
for the purpose of impeaching him. The Court noted, however, that the
more probable grounds for exclusion was the former since the latter ground
was dispelled in Koester v. Rochester Candy Works. 2
56. Supra note 1 at 186, 189 N.Y.S.2d 144 (1959).
57. Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517 (1930).
58. N.Y. Cv. PRAC. AcT § 374-a provides:
Any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a book or
otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction,
occurrence or event shall be admissible in evidence in proof of said act,
transaction, occurrence or event if the trial judge shall find that it was
made in the regular course of any business, and that it was the regular
course of such business to make such memorandum or record at the time
of such act, transaction, occurrence or event, or within a reasonable time
thereafter. All other circumstances of the making of such writing or
record, including lack of personal knowledge by the entrant or maker,
may be shown to affect its weight, but they shall not affect its ad-
missibility.
59. 5 N.Y.2d 425, 185 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1959).
60. 6 A.D.2d 888, 177 N.Y.S.2d 1017 (2d Dep't 1958).
61. Supra note 59.
62. 194 N.Y. 92, 87 N.E. 77 (1909). The court said at 194 N.Y. 97, 98, "When,
however, it is said that one cannot impeach his own witness by contradictory state-
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